Theory in detail
This page was written by Jem Page, an A level student at the Arnewood School, 2007.
Hard Determinism
The theory of Universal Causation maintains that everything in the universe (including human action) has a cause which precedes it.
e.g. A = friction, B = heat occurs
or A = rubbing hands together, B = hands warmer
This is the basis of science - if it wasn't the case that one event or set of circumstances lead to another, scientific observation, and the conclusions drawn, would be pointless and meaningless.
If a doctor cannot explain the cause of a set of symptoms, he doesn't presume that they have no cause, but that the cause is unknown.
Psychology, sociology and anthropology can account for human behaviour and emotions.
Locke gave the example of a man who wakes up in a room that, unknown to him, is locked from the outside. He chooses to stay in the room, believing he has chosen freely. In reality, he has no option. However, his ignorance of this gives him an illusion of freedom.
Let us suppose it were established that a man commits murder only if, sometime during the previous week, he has eaten a certain combination of foods—say, tuna fish salad at a meal also including peas, mushroom soup, and blueberry pie. What if we were to track down the factors common to all murders committed in this country during the last twenty years and found this factor present in all of them, and only in them? The example is of course empirically absurd; but may it not be that there is some combination of factors that regularly leads to homicide?
Someone commits a crime and is punished by the state; ‘he deserved it,’ we say self-righteously—as if we were moral and he immoral, when in fact we are lucky and he is unlucky—forgetting that there, but for the grace of God and a fortunate early environment, go we.
Libertarianism
Libertarians accept that universal causation would apply to a mechanistic world, but that this would not influence human choice. A kleptomaniac may be inclined to steal, but has the choice not to.
There is a difference between the empirically analysable personality and one's moral self.
e.g. A youth in a ghetto may be likely to become a gangster because it is in his interests, however, his moral self may override this and he might become a policeman.
All of our actions are based on the assumption that we are free. We can only make decisions about what to do if:
- we do not already know what we are going to do
- it is in our power to do what we are thinking of doing
Necessary and contingent truth
There are statements that are necessarily true. For example, analytic truths such as "All bachelors are unmarried". Other truths are no less true - it is sunny today. This is true, but it is only contigently true, it could conceivably be false.
Michael Palmer, in 'Moral Problems', gives the example of three runners. A is faster than B, B is faster than C. What would happen if they raced? The answer is that we cannot know for certain - when we say "A is faster than B" this is a contingent truth. It means that in the past, A has run faster than B. It doesn't mean that A will necessarily run faster than B in the future.
The argument here is that contingent truths about the world make the future unpredictable. Something may actually happen in the future (A may actually beat B), but that doesn't mean it necessarily had to happen. We cannot know the future from contingent predictions.
Soft Determinism/Compatibilism
Soft Determinism accepts that all of our actions are determined. However, there is a difference between Ghandi choosing to fast, and a man being locked up without food. In both cases, the actions are determined, and the men could not do otherwise. However, what determines Ghandi's actions is internal, where as the man locked up has been externally caused to be without food.
A compatibilist, who believes that determinism and free will are compatible, would draw a distinction between actions caused or determined by our personalities ('free' actions) and actions with external causes (where we are 'co-erced')
Compatibilism, unlike hard determinism, allows for moral responsibility. If X does not save a drowning child because X cannot swim, he is not morally responsible. However, if he chooses not to because of his personality, a combination of his conditioning, an event in his childhood etc, then he is to be held responsible.
